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The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), currently
composed of a majority of members appointed by President Reagan,'
has in recent months been reversing earlier Board decisions at a fast and
furious pace. These reversals have involved a number of critical la-
bor/management issues including: the right of employers to relocate
work during the term of a union contract, 2 the deferral of unfair labor
practice charges to labor arbitrators,3 the legality of misrepresentations
of fact during labor representation campaigns, 4 rules regarding solicita-
tion and distribution, 5 and employer interrogation of employees regard-
ing their union sympathies.
6
Labor Board vacillation in decisionmaking has been a perennial
problem, 7 and in many respects reflects the quasi-political nature of the
agency. 8 The intensity of recent Board "flip-flopping," however, has
prompted increased concern regarding the impact such shifts in policy
have on the effective administration of the Labor Act.
Observers have contended that such rapid changes create consider-
able uncertainty and instability in the law,9 and indeed tend to en-
courage parties to press cases they might otherwise have settled had the
* Assistant Professor, Texas A&M Business School; B.S., Cornell University; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; M.A., (In economics), University of California, Los Angeles.
Fellow, UCLA Program in Law and Economics, 1978-80.
1. The three Reagan appointees are Donald Dotson (chair), Patricia Diaz Dennis,
and Robert Hunter. For a biographical sketch of Board members and a review of recent
Board squabbling, see Wall St. J., June 28, 1984, at 29, col. 3.
2. See Milwaukee Springs II, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
16,029 (1984), rev k Milwaukee Springs I, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
3. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
16,027 (1984), revg General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
4. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), revg General Knit of
Cal., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
5. See Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) $ 16,003
(1983), revg T.R.W. Bearings, 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981).
6. See Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,225
(1984), revg PPG Indus., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980).
7. See Dunau, The Role of Criticism in the Work of the National Labor Relations Board, 16
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 205 (1963); Hickey, Stare Decisis and the NLRB, 17 LAB. L.J. 451
(1966); Cooke & Gautschi, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 539 (1982).
8. See generally Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93
(1955).
9. See Cooke & Gautsche, supra note 7, at 548-59; NLRB Rulings That Are Inflaming
Labor Relations, Bus. W.,June 11, 1984 at 122 (statements of William N. Cooke, a "promi-
nent Washington management attorney").
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"rules of the game" themselves been more settled.' 0 One president of a
major union recently put it as follows: "The pendulum in Labor Board
decisions has swung so rapidly and erratically over the recent past that
volumes of Board precedents no longer can be relied upon by unions or
employers and their legal counsel."" Such concerns have also
prompted a number of prominent observers of the labor scene to call
for congressional action to deal with this "problem."12
This article will explore the NLRB's recent policy reversals in the
context of these calls for congressional reform. Part II will examine
three important areas where NLRB shifting decision-making has been of
a particularly strident nature. Part III will then address the policy impli-
cations of these shifts in terms of some possible avenues for congres-
sional reform. In this regard, particular attention will be given to the
various proposals raised as part of the aborted Labor Law Reform Act of
1978,'3 and to broader administrative law implications which may be
involved in any legislative reforms in this area. Part IV will conclude
with a call for limited congressional action.
I. SOME REPRESENTATIVE AREAS OF NLRB POLICY REVERSAL
A. Arbitration and the National Labor Relations Act
Over ninety percent of extant labor-management collective bargain-
ing agreements in the United States contain grievance arbitration
clauses pursuant to which disputes arising between the parties, during
the term of the agreement, are submitted for final and binding resolu-
tion to a neutral third party arbitrator. 14 Such grievance arbitration
clauses grew in popularity after Congress, in the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments of 1947, amended the Labor Act to specifically encourage parties
to establish voluntary dispute settlement procedures, 15 and made con-
tractual grievance arbitration clauses directly enforceable in federal dis-
trict court. 16 The national policy favoring the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes through grievance arbitration also received a sharp boost
in 1960 from the Supreme Court in three decisions known as the "Steel-
worker's Trilogy."' 17 There has been, however, an ongoing tension be-
tween the national policy favoring labor arbitration, and the role of the
10. See 14 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 194 (Nov. 7, 1983) (statement of NLRB Member
Patricia Diaz Dennis); see generally Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
279 (1973).
11. 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 190 (July 9, 1984) (statements of Thomas W. Gleason,
President, International Long Shoremen's Association).
12. See Cool Rhetoric; Bitter NLRB Debate, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 203 (March 12,
1984) (statement of then NLRB General Counsel William Lubbers); see generally Regulatory
Reform For NLRB Stability, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 68-69 (May 28, 1984).
13. This legislation was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives but filibustered
in the U.S. Senate. For a complete listing of the relevant legislation, see Comment, Labor
Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Election, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 755 & n. 1 (1979).
14. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 7 (5th Ed. 1978).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
17. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
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National Labor Relations Board in enforcing the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or Act).18 This tension has been reflected in a string of
shifts in Labor Board policy in this area.
By way of background, take, for example, the case of a unionized
employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement which
provides, as nearly all of them do, that employees cannot be fired except
for "just cause." 19 The employee is then fired for trying to get new
employees to join the union.20 This action would almost certainly not
constitute "just cause" for dismissal, and would thus represent a con-
tractual violation. It would also represent a violation of the NLRA,
which in section 8(a)(3), 2 1 prohibits discrimination against employees
on the basis of union activity. The issue then becomes: where does the
employee go first to assert his rights, to a labor arbitrator with the power
to enforce the collective bargaining contract, or to the Board with the
power to enforce the NLRA?2 2 The issue has been a highly controver-
sial one.
In 1971 the NLRB addressed this issue in the leading case of Collyer
Insulated Wire. 23 In Collyer an employer unilaterally changed his pay
scale, an action which arguably violated both the parties' collective bar-
gaining contract and section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 24 Section 8(a)(5) gener-
ally makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to fail to bargain with
unions in "good faith" over issues like pay and other "mandatory" sub-
jects of bargaining before they take action with respect to them. 2 5 The
union wanted the NLRB, as opposed to an arbitrator, to address the
alleged violation first. The Board demurred over the dissent of its two
most pro-union members, 2 6 and held that the parties had agreed to sub-
mit contractual disputes to arbitration and that the Board would defer
from intervention until the parties' own dispute-resolution machinery
had been utilized. One year later, in the National Radio27 case, the Board
extended its Collyer pre-arbitration deferral policy to cases involving in-
stances other than refusals to bargain, including alleged individual rights
violations of sections 8(a)(1) 2 8 and 8(a)(3) such as the kind set forth in
the example above involving an employee being discharged for union
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
19. See generally Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 483-84 (1976).
20. In states which have passed "right-to-work" laws pursuant to NLRA § 14(b), it is
unlawful for a union and employer to have an agreement requiring union membership as a
condition of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
22. See generally Vause, The NLRB Policy on Deferral to Arbitration-Deference or Abdication?,
58 FLA. B.J. 461 (1984).
23. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
25. See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
498-523 (1976).
26. The dissenters were members John Fanning and Howard Jenkins.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
28. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
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organizing activity.
2 9
Five years later, however, with new membership on the Board, the
NLRB reversed its decision in National Radio. The Board held in the
1977 General American Transportation Corp.30 case that it would no longer
defer to arbitration cases involving the exercise of individual employee
rights under the Act such as those involving alleged violations of sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). In a case decided the same day, however, the
Board reaffirmed its original Collyer decision policy of initially deferring
to arbitration charges involving alleged refusals to bargain.
3 1
The Board's holding in General American Transportation was not, how-
ever, destined to be a long standing one. On January 19, 1984, the
Board, again comprised of new members decided, in the case of United
Technologies Corp. ,32 to reverse General American and reinstate the rule of
National Radio. This constituted the third major shift on the issue of pre-
arbitration deferral of unfair labor practice charges in approximately
thirteen years.
The Board's record of policy reversals is perhaps even worse on the
issue of post-arbitration deferral. Cases in this area arise after arbitration
has been conducted, and there is a question as to how much weight the
Board should give the arbitrator's award in a subsequent unfair labor
practice case. The general standards were set forth by the Board in the
1955 case of Spielberg Manufacturing3 3 where the Board said that, in gen-
eral, it would broadly defer to an arbitrator's award in any subsequent
proceeding so long as the arbitrator's decision was "not clearly repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the Act. ' 34
Eight years later, however, the "Kennedy Board" in its Raytheon
Co. 3 5 decision said that it would not defer to an arbitrator's decision un-
less the arbitrator had carefully considered the unfair labor practice is-
sue involved in the case. This decision was reversed in 1974 by the
"Nixon Board" in Electronic Reproduction Service Corp. ,36 which essentially
returned to the old Spielberg standard. Electronic Reproduction Service was
overruled in 1980 by the "Carter Board" in Suburban Motor Freight
37
which essentially returned to the holding of the Raytheon case. In its
1982 Propoco, Inc. 38 decision, though, the Carter Board went even be-
yond the holding of the Raytheon case, and decided to limit deferral to an
arbitrator's award in subsequent Board proceedings involving the same
case only to instances where the arbitrator procedurally disposed of the
issues in precisely the same manner the Board would have. The Board's
post-arbitration deferral policy has culminated, for the present, in the
29. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
30. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
31. See Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
32. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,027 (1984).
33. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
34. Id. at 1081.
35. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
36. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
37. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
38. 236 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
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"Reagan Board's" 1984 decision in Olin Corp. 39 overruling Suburban Mo-
tor Freight and Propoco and again essentially returning to the "Eisenhower
Board's" Spielberg standard. To say the least, the Board's policy ap-
proach to this area has not been a static one!
B. The Work Relocation Conundrum
Perhaps the most controversial 40 recent decision of the Reagan La-
bor Board was its decision in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Co. ,41 better known as Milwaukee Spring II. This decision involved
the critical issue of union veto power over employer determinations to
relocate a plant.
Legal analysis of this issue turns to a large degree on section 8(d)
4 2
of the Act which mandates that once a union and a company reach
agreement over a collective bargaining contract, the company is re-
quired to obtain the union's consent before it can modify any term of the
contract. If, for example, a union contract provides that for the con-
tract's duration employees are to be paid ten dollars an hour, an em-
ployer seeking to reduce this rate of pay to nine dollars per hour must
first obtain the union's consent. A change without such consent would
constitute both a breach of contract and an unfair labor practice.
4 3
The fact that the employer's desire to modify the above hourly rate
was motivated by economic necessity does not privilege the modifica-
tion. Nor does it matter that the employer was willing to bargain in
good faith, or that the employer has bargained in good faith before tak-
ing action. The employer's modification of an extant collective bargain-
ing contract without union consent, in and of itself, violates the Act.
4 4
In a string of decisions4 5 culminating in the first Milwaukee Spring
case 4 6 (Milwaukee Spring I), the Carter Board held that a decision by an
employer having a union contract to relocate work constituted a "modi-
fication," albeit an indirect one, of the given contract's wage, benefit and
recognition provisions. Consequently, such relocations made without
the given union's consent were deemed to violate section 8(d) and con-
stitute unfair labor practices subject to Board remedial powers under
section 10 of the NLRA.
4 7
The Reagan NLRB, however, in its highly controversial decision in
Milwaukee Spring II overruled these earlier decisions and held that absent
39. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,028 (1984).
40. See Statement of Peter G. Nash Before Joint Hearings before House Subcomm. on Labor-Man-
agement Relations and Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing at 7 (June 26, 1984) (on file, Texas
A&M Business School).
41. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,029 (1984).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
43. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973), enforced, 505 F.2d
1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
44. See C&S Industries, 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
45. See Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769 (1979); Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235
N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1979).
46. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
47. 219 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
1985]
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specific language to the contrary, employer decisions to relocate work
can, once "good faith" bargaining has been conducted, be made without
the given union's consent.4 8 The Board held that section 8(d) prohibits
mid-term contractual modification without union consent only of terms
"contained in" the parties' collective bargaining agreement. In the
Board's opinion, unless the parties included a "work preservation" or
similar clause clearly within the contract, the Board would not attempt
to read such a provision into the parties' agreement.49 In short, under
the new Reagan NLRB interpretation, unlawful contract modifications
will be found only where a term contained in the contract is clearly being
modified. How a Democratic appointed Board might interpret section
8(d) at some point in the future is certainly open to speculation.
C. Representation Election "Misrepresentations of Fact"
A final notable area which is representative of Board policy rever-
sals is the NLRB's regulation of labor representation election misrepre-
sentations of fact. In 1947, as part of that year's Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA, Congress enacted section 8(c) 50 of the Labor
Act. This section afforded both employers and unions rights of "free
speech" under the Act, and stated that speech by either party would not
constitute an unfair labor practice as long as it did not contain a "threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
5 1
The Truman Labor Board, however, declined to give free rein to
labor speech despite seemingly clear congressional intent and action.
Instead, in the landmark 1948 case of General Shoe Corp. 5 2 the Board dif-
ferentiated between labor speech which constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice, i.e., speech prohibited by section 8(c), and speech which is lawful
under section 8(c), but which the NLRB nevertheless deems to interfere
with holding fair labor representation elections. For example, an in-
flammatory appeal to racial prejudice may contain no "threat . . . or
promise of benefit" and thus be lawful under section 8(c). But it may
nevertheless be held by the NLRB to improperly interfere with the hold-
ing of a labor representation election and thus justify postponing or set-
ting aside such an election. 53 Similarly, the NLRB has held that
employer or union election misrepresentations of fact, e.g., misstate-
ments regarding the amount of money earned by unionized employees
at other plants, can also constitute improper election interferences. 5 4
48. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) $ 16,029 (1984) at 27,333-
27,335.
49. Id.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
51. Id. This provision was enacted in response to the Board's doctrine of "strict neu-
trality" prohibiting any anti-union speech by employers, and the Supreme Court's decision
in the case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), holding this
practice to be unlawful. For an excellent discussion of the history behind this provision
see Comment, supra note 13, at 756-62.
52. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
53. See e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
54. For an outstanding, albeit now somewhat dated, study of the whole issue of NLRB
[Vol. 62:2
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The Board's regulation of this latter area, however, has of late been
something akin to a roller coaster ride.
Perhaps the leading case involving the NLRB's regulation of labor
election campaign misrepresentations of facts is the Kennedy Board's
1962 decision in Hollywood Ceramics Co.55 In this case the Board explic-
itly set forth the rule that a labor election will be set aside where there
has been a misrepresentation (or other campaign trickery) which "in-
volves a substantial departure from the truth . . . [and which] may rea-
sonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election."
56
Almost from the day Hollywood Ceramics was decided, however, labor
analysts have questioned the Board's ability to determine what kinds of
statements actually have a "significant impact" on an election, and have
criticized the subjectivity involved in these determinations. 57 In 1976
these criticisms were buttressed by a major, and highly controversial,
5 8
empirical study by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman 59 which
attacked the basic behavioral assumption behind the Hollywood Ceramics
doctrine: that employee voters are generally influenced by campaign
misrepresentations and other election propaganda. The Getman,
Goldberg and Herman empirical study purported to show that employ-
ees are generally inattentive to information offered during representa-
tion election campaigns and uninfluenced by it in their voting. 60
Relying on the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study and on a gen-
eral perception of increased employee sophistication, the Nixon Board
in 1977 overruled the Hollywood Ceramics decision in the case of Shopping
Kart Food Market, Inc.6 1 where it held that it would "no longer set elec-
tions aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements." '6 2 This de-
cision represented the Nixon Board's "last hurrah," however, for less
than two years later the Carter Board, in General Knit of California,63 over-
ruled Shopping Kart and reinstated the general rule of Hollywood Ceramics.
But the issue was not yet to be put to rest. Soon there was another
change of national administration, and the Reagan Board in the case of
Midland National Life Insurance Co.6 4 abruptly overruled General Knit and
reinstated the precedent of Shopping Kart. In sum, over the past seven
years the NLRB has reversed itself three times with respect to its role in
regulation of campaign tactics, see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
55. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
56. Id. at 224.
57. See e.g., R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HOHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CON-
DUCT 57 (1974).
58. See e.g., Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study From a Trade-Unionist s Point of
View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1781-87 (1983).
59. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG &J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY (1976).
60. Id. at 149.
61. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
62. Id. at 1313.
63. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
64. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
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regulating misrepresentations of fact in labor representation elections. 6 5
II. OPrIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
From some perspectives, the best reform which could be made re-
garding the Board's shifting policies is no reform at all. Indeed, the
whole controversy regarding NLRB policy reversals may be much ado
about nothing.
Adopting this point of view, the Collyer/General American Transporta-
tion/United Technologies, Spielberg/Suburban Motor Freight/Olin, Milwaukee
Spring, and Shopping Kart/General Knit/Midland National Life "flip-flops"
can be regarded as anomalies. It is a fact that the overwhelming major-
ity of the Board's decisions involve clear adherence to time-honored
precedents. 6 6 Over ninety percent of all NLRB decisions are, regardless
of political shifts in membership, made by a unanimous vote. 67 Conse-
quently, we might accept occasional flip-flopping with respect to a few
highly controversial issues. This may be the price we must pay for hav-
ing an administrative agency, with considerable flexibility and discre-
tion, regulate a highly contentious and ever-changing area of the law.
6 8
With regard to the political nature of the Board's policy shifts, i.e.,
policies changing as a result of new political appointments to the Board,
it can be argued that administrative agencies like the NLRB should be
responsive to changes in national political administration. 6 9 First, as
former SEC Chairman William Cary has insightfully pointed out, while
the ordinary operations of an administrative agency generally have little
political effect, there can be serious deleterious impact on the incum-
bent resident of the White House "if there is any trouble." 70 Thus if the
President may ultimately be held politically responsible for an adminis-
trative agency's actions, it is reasonable for him to appoint agency mem-
bers who will best promote his political ideologies and goals. Shifts in
the substance of Board policy which follow shifts in the Board's political
complexion may be necessary, as Professor David Shapiro has noted, "if
the administration of federal labor law is to reflect in some degree the
prevailing political climate." 7 1 Professor Clyde W. Summers has elabo-
rated on this theme, stating:
Ought not government, in the making of policies, reflect major-
65. For a stinging criticism regarding the NLRB's "fickleness" in this area of the law,
see Mosey Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
66. See generatly Dunau, supra note 7, at 211-12. But see id. at 212 (pointing out that
sometimes the issue of quality is far more important than quantity).
67. See Statement of Edward B. Miller Before House Oversight Hearings On NLRB, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at E-7 (June 27, 1984).
68. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the Board possesses a wide degree of
discretion and flexibility in applying the NLRA. See generatty Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 48-52 (1954); NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946); Republic of Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
69. See generally Hickey, supra note 7, at 460-61.
70. See W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 7-9 (1967).
71. See Shapiro, Why Do Voters Vote?, 86 YALE L.J. 1532, 1545 (1977).
[Vol. 62:2
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ity will? Should not administrative agencies, within the area of
discretion granted them, choose the policy which most accu-
rately expresses the desires of the majority? To do so is to
make democracy more responsive, an especially significant con-
tribution when government tends to become remote. It is true
that our principal instrument for expressing majority will is
Congress speaking through legislation. However, there is seri-
ous doubt whether Congress is capable of expressing small
shifts or gradual changes. Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act make long jumps, tending to go beyond the ex-
isting balance of public opinion. The Board, by bending to the
wind can enable the same statutory words to serve a range of
shifts, thus avoiding the necessity of frequent changes. When
the amendments come, it can soften the shock and ease the ad-
justment, thereby preserving a measure of continuity and
stability.
72
Professor Summers thus offers a more subtle, positive view of policy
shifts that follow changes in the political complexion of the Board. Such
shifts help keep the NLRA a malleable and responsive document, rather
than one set in stone. Shifts in Board policy serve as precursors for fu-
ture legislative reform, softening the blow when such reforms come. In
this respect, such shifts enable far greater stability and continuity.
Congress, though, has put some clear checks on the political nature
of the Board. Appointments to the Board are for staggered terms of five
years, which is, of course, one year longer than that of the President.
73
Board members cannot be removed from office by the President absent
"neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" and even under such circum-
stances cannot be forced out without "notice and hearing."' 74 Further,
appointments to the Board are subject to Senate advice and consent.
7 5
The Senate on occasion has exercised its prerogative to reject a Presi-
dent's nominee, most notably in the recent case of President Reagan's
nomination of John Van de Water to the post of Board Chairman.
76
72. See Summers, supra note 8, at 100.
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). For a general discussion of the importance of stag-
gered terms which are longer than those of the President, from the perspective of regula-
tory independence, see MacIntyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 FEn. BAR J. 1, 4
(1969). The importance of such staggered terms diminishes, of course, if a President
serves for more than one term. Id. at 4.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). Judiciai guidelines regarding the removal of admninis-
trative agency members by the President were established in the case of Humphrey's Exec-
utor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). That case was an outgrowth of an attempt by
President Franklin Roosevelt to remove, for political reasons, a commissioner of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. The Supreme Court held that administrative agencies had quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative powers which were different from those of the executive de-
partments. Consequently, while the President had absolute removal power over executive
officers, he did not have such power over quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative officers. See
generally Dixon, The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27 AD. L. REV. 1, 3
(1975).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
76. For a criticism of the Senate's failure to confirm Van de Water by a former Board
member, see Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Directions of the NLRB, 34 lAB.
L.J. 215, 228 (1983).
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Thus, as the late labor practitioner and scholar Bernard Dunau
77
noted, Congress has established a delicate balance with respect to the
appropriate level of NLRB political responsiveness. In Dunau's opin-
ion, if in nothing more than setting the term of Board tenure at five
years, Congress has consciously assured "the infusion of new faces at
fairly frequent intervals," and that these new faces will invariably hold
differing political views. 78 Dunau further points out that "[i]f in one
sense this hinders stability, in another sense it impedes stagnation, and
it is not unfair to conclude that Congress prefers the former risk to the
latter." 79 For example, by mandating five year terms for members of
the NLRB, in contrast to the fourteen year terms provided for members
of the Federal Reserve Board,80 Congress has deliberately chosen the
Board to be an agency which is relatively sensitive to shifts in the polit-
ical winds. In Dunau's opinion, if Congress is unhappy about this situa-
tion it should do something about it; in the meantime, blame for shifting
Board policy should be placed on Congress and not on Board
appointees.81
B. Altering Board Tenure and Composition
Given the discussion above, one obvious option for reform in de-
politicizing the NLRB would be for Congress to lengthen the tenure in
office of Board members or alter the Board's structure and composition.
Indeed, one such reform was considered by Congress as part of the ill-
fated Labor Law Reform Act of 1978.82 Under both the House and
Senate versions of the proposed Labor Reform Act, section 3(a) of the
NLRA was to be amended to provide staggered seven year terms for
Board members.8 3 In addition, these proposed statutory amendments
provided that no more than a simple majority of the members of the
Board were to be members of the same political party.
8 4
Both of these amendments were part of a broader proposal to ex-
pand the size of the NLRB from five to seven members, and unfortu-
nately were greatly overshadowed in the ensuing debate.
8 5
Nevertheless, both Congress and those testifying before it were aware of
the potential benefits of extending members' terms to seven years. The
77. For a memorial tribute to Dunau's legal skills both as a scholar and practitioner
see the articles set forth in 62 VA. L. REV. 469-662 (1976).
78. See Dunau, supra note 7, at 225.
79. Id.
80. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
81. See Dunau, supra note 7, at 225-29.
82. This Act was introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 8310, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977) and in the Senate as S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1978).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) at 52; S. REP. No. 628, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) at 45.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1031-35 (1977) (analysis of pro-
vision by former Board General Counsel Peter Nash on behalf of management clients). See




Senate Human Resources Committee, for example, noted in its legisla-
tive report that longer terms might create "greater stability" and result
in Board decisions in precedent setting cases being accorded "a greater
degree of respect by the affected parties."' 86 Former United Auto Work-
ers President Douglas Fraser elaborated on this theme in his congres-
sional testimony, stating that: "the use of a seven-year term should
moderate the political see-sawing the Board has seen throughout its his-
tory. It will take nearly two full presidential terms to appoint a com-
pletely new Board, rather than the approximately one term now
required. 
8 7
Further, Congress also clearly wanted to codify the existing "de
facto" practice of having no more than a simple majority of Board mem-
bers from the same political party. As the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor noted: "[alt the present the practice is that no more than
three members of the Board shall be members of the same political
party. To assure continued balance on the Board, [this bill] expressly
provides that no more than a simple majority of the Board's member-
ship shall be drawn from one party."
'88
One obvious question which must be asked, however, is how much
impact amendments providing longer terms for members, and mandat-
ing political party "balance," would really have on depoliticizing the
Board? One need only look to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-
which has had from its inception, both seven-year terms for commission-
ers and provisions statutorily mandating political party balance 89-for
evidence that the impact of such legislative amendments on depoliticiza-
tion may not be great. The FTC has regularly experienced sharp shifts
in policy resulting from political shifts in membership. 90 In 1980, Con-
gress, reacting in part to the "politically charged" nature of the Com-
mission's activities, enacted special legislation sharply limiting the
Commission's authority. 9 1
Important in all of this is the fact that requiring that no more than a
simple majority of an administrative agency's members be from the
same political party may not necessarily provide an adequate check on
86. S. REP, No. 628, supra note 83, at 8.
87. Hearings, supra note 85, at 1618.
88. H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 83, at 31.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
90. Most recently, for example, "activist" Democratic Chairman Michael Pertschuk's
strong push for the stricter regulation of children's television advertising fell into oblivion
when Republican James C. Miller, an advocate of less government intervention in private
enterprise, became the new FTC Chairman. See generally Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1981, at
D 11, col. I. For a more general discussion of this issue in the context of the FTC, see
Stewart & Cromartie, Partisan Presidential Change and Regulatory Policy: The Case of the FTC
and Deceptive Practices Enforcement, 1938-1974, 12 PRES. STuD. Q., (Fall 1982).
91. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Public L. No. 96-252,
94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified in various sections of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51
(1982). This legislation was enacted despite the fact that Congress was dominated in both
houses by the same political party as dominated the FTC. Indeed, the legislation was
signed into law by a President who was also a member of the same party and who had also
appointed the new "politically charged" FTC members.
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undue agency politicization. Certainly, the current de facto practice of
the NLRB has had relatively little such effect. 92 One former NLRB
member has observed that political labels are of no meaning whatso-
ever.93 The simple truth of the matter is that categorization of an indi-
vidual as "Republican" or "Democrat" can be very misleading. A
President can appoint a conservative Democrat or a liberal Republican
and meet the "no more than a simple majority from one political party"
litmus test, while creating a clear ideological imbalance within a given
agency. Nevertheless, there are indications that Congress will go only
so far in allowing "wolves to parade in sheep's clothing." Recently, for
example, the Senate rejected the nomination of a purported "Demo-
crat" to a "democratic" seat on the FTC, at least in part because of a
feeling that President Reagan, in appointing the former director of
"Democrats for Reagan," had pushed things beyond acceptable limits.
94
Consequently, even if only at the outer extremes, it seems that
political party limitations on agency appointments do put a political
check on administrative agency makeup. Coupled with longer tenure
for agency members and other possible reforms, 95 such limitations may
help to stabilize and depoliticize administrative agencies. Those
pondering future reforms with respect to the NLRB might do well to
keep this in mind.
C. Greater Board Use of Rulemaking
Section 6 of the NLRA gives the NLRB the power to make, rescind,
and amend in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this [act]." 96 Despite its section 6 rulemaking author-
ity, however, the Board has almost completely refused to engage in
rulemaking, instead preferring to reach policy decisions on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis. 9 7 This refusal by the Board to engage in rulemaking
92. Former NLRB Member Peter Walther, a relatively pro-management Republican
appointee, points out that over sixty percent of his Board dissents were from majority
opinions written by the three "Republican" members of the Board. Walther, supra note
73, at 228.
93. Id. See generally Irving, Recent NLRB Developments: The Survival of the Misguided Ma-
jority, THE SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE OF LABOR LAW, 78 (1982).
94. See Wall St.J., March 31, 1982, at 22, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, at D2, col.
1.
95. One possibility in this regard might be congressional legislation mandating a tri-
partite NLRB; made up of designated number of members representing labor, manage-
ment and the general public. A number of the boards administering state public sector
labor relations acts have been constituted in this manner. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 34:13A-5.2 (West Supp. 1984). A tri-partite approach to the administration of labor
laws is also quite common on Western Europe. See Aaron, Labor Courts: Western European
Models and Their Significance for the United States, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 847, 854-55 (1969).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). Since the NLRA does not specifically mandate formal
"on the record" rulemaking, the type of rulemaking proceeding required under NLRA
section six is the "informal". "notice and comment" kind. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
97. See generally Parker & Gilmore, The Unfair Labor Practice Caseload: An Analysis of Se-
lected Remedies, 34 LAB. L. J. 172, 173 (1983). The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aero-
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has been strongly and perenially criticized by a multitude of observers. 9 8
As Professor Clyde W. Summers has stated:
The National Labor Relations Board, in administering the
Act, has followed almost exclusively the procedure of case by
case adjudication. This method, specially designed for resolv-
ing questions of fact, has limited usefulness in policy making.
It is fragmentary in character, placing primary emphasis on the
special facts of the single case, and focusing attention on one
small facet of what is often a complex problem. This piecemeal
process makes perspective difficult, for it tends to obscure the
fact that policy is being made and to discourage direct discus-
sion of the wisdom of the policy.
Policy making requires full consideration of an entire
problem in its context, with a weighing of the views of all inter-
ested parties. The impact of a proposed policy in every fore-
seeable situation needs to be carefully studied and all possible
alternatives considered. The adjudicatory process is ill-
adapted to these ends. The procedures prescribed for rule
making, especially those sketched in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, are far more appropriate.
The Board is not compelled to continue with such awk-
ward and inadequate procedures, for Section 6 grants to it
broad powers to carry out the provisions of the Act through
rule making. It is submitted that the adoption and extensive
use of rule making procedures would substantially improve the
policy developing functions of the Board. It would compel the
Board to face more directly its policy problems, would provide
more complete and pointed discussion, and would encourage
the Board to make more articulate the rules and policies which
it follows. 99
In response to Professor Summers and others, the proposed Labor
Law Reform Act of 1978 contained major amendments to section 6 of
the NLRA. The amendments required the Board to promulgate rules
regarding appropriate units for collective bargaining,' 0 0 and rules per-
taining to the standards to be applied in regulating labor elections. 1°O
To support these proposed statutory amendments both the House and
Senate Labor Committees stated: "[t]here is no labor relations issue on
space, 416 U.S. 267 (1974), though, clearly held that the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies within the NLRB's discretion.
98. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB "s Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 79 YALE L. J. 571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-making Powers of the
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L. J. 729 (1961); Comment, Shopping Kart: The Need
for a Broader Approach to the Problems of Campaign Regulation, 56 N.C.L. REV. 389, 403-04
(1978). But see generally Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89
YALE L.J. 982 (1980).
99. Summers, supra note 8, at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
100. For a general discussion of the issue of appropriate bargaining units, see R.
Gorman, supra note 25, at 66-92.
101. See H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 6(b)(1) & (2) and S. 1883, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., §§ 6(b)(1) & (2) texts reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 5-6, 28-29. See
also H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 83, at 53; S. REP. No. 628, supra note 83, at 47-48.
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which there has been such a strong consensus as on the proposition that
the Board should make greater use of its rule-making authority under
section 6 of the Act."
10 2
Greater use of rulemaking may indeed be one way to create greater
stability and predictability in Board actions. One benefit would be that
shifts in policy, although they might still occur,' 0 3 would be less abrupt.
If nothing else, pursuant to APA rulemaking guidelines, interested par-
ties would have advance notice of the proposed change and the oppor-
tunity to comment on it. 10 4  Rulemaking also avoids the myriad of
problems 10 5 involved in applying policy changes retroactively. 10 6
Perhaps even more significantly, rulemaking would recognize shifts
in policy for what they are, and make them more visible. Professor
David Shapiro has conjectured that part of the reason for the Board's
reluctance to engage in rulemaking might stem from the view that its
changes in policy "would be more visible, and thus more embarrasing, if
such changes were made by amending an outstanding regulation."' 10 7
Under rulemaking, as Shapiro implies, Board policy changes would be
made explicitly and openly. Rulemaking would not allow the Board to
justify its decisions on narrow factual grounds turning on the peculiari-
ties of a given case.' 0 8 One positive result of this approach, and the
increased visibility it requires, might be a greater reluctance on the part
of the Board to make rapid and radical shifts in policy. 10 9
Another positive result of the rulemaking approach, as Professor
Samuel Estriecher recently pointed out very forcefully, would be the op-
portunity it affords for greater public commentary, input, and debate on
major issues of Board policy." 0 Rulemaking affords an opportunity to
look at a problem from its broadest perspective and evaluate the views
of all interested parties."I' Rulemaking proceedings would also afford
the Board the flexibility to consider alternatives more varied than merely
upholding or overruling a given precedent." 12
Further, under rulemaking a complete hearing could be given to the
premise underlying the Board's decision. For example, in the misrepre-
sentations of fact area, the Board in overruling its Hollywood Ceramics de-
cision in the Shopping Karl case, relied heavily, albeit selectively, on the
empirical study done by Professor Julius Getman and his colleagues." 3
Rulemaking proceedings would allow free public discussion of such
102. See H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 83, at 36; S. REP. No. 628, supra note 83, at 19.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982) (giving the Board the power to "rescind" and
"amend", as well as "make" rules pursuant to the APA).
104. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(2) & (3) & (c) (1982).
105. See 116 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 145 (June 25, 1984) (statement of union labor attor-
ney Marc Rauch).
106. See generally Bernstein, supra note 98, at 598-602.
107. See Shapiro, supra note 71, at 1544.
108. See Bernstein, supra note 98, at 597-98.
109. See generally Bernstein, supra note 98, at 597.
110. See 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 142-44 (June 25, 1984).
111. See Summers, supra note 8, at 105-06.
112. See Comment, supra note 98, at 403-04.
113. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
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studies and permit them to be viewed from a broad perspective, includ-
ing their implications on the Board's overall policy. In addition, data
regarding such studies could be presented in informal rulemaking pro-
ceedings without the strictures of the formal rules of evidence which are
generally applicable in adjudicatory proceedings.
1 14
Finally, it may be possible for the NLRB, in some circumstances, to
use rulemaking and adjudication in tandem.' 15 For example, the Board,
to gain some experience in a given area, could proceed at first on a case-
by-case basis. During this period the Board could expressly limit the
precedential authority of its decisions, suggesting that it was in the pro-
cess of evolving a rule and that changes might come in the process. Per-
haps at this stage the Board might issue a broad non-binding "general
statement of policy"' 16 signaling where it was heading. Then, at a point
when the Board felt it had gained sufficient knowledge of the problem, it
could hold binding rulemaking proceedings to elaborate and crystallize
the rule.
In sum, greater use of Board rulemaking might create a regulatory
system with greater certainty and stability. Policy shifts would be recog-
nized for what they are and would be given a full public airing. A system
involving abrupt, retroactive, factually-oriented policy shifts would be
replaced by one requiring a full opportunity for notice and public com-
ment, and involving prospective applications. Congress, in considering
possible labor law reforms, should once again consider the possibility of
mandating that the NLRB make greater use of rulemaking.
D. Selectively Amending the Act
1. Overview
One final possible option for Congress in terms of dealing with the
problem of NLRB policy reversals would be to make selective clarifying
amendments to given provisions of the NLRA. Two particularly salient
amendments in this regard were offered as part of the proposed Labor
Reform Act of 1978.117
2. Applying Section 8 (c) to Representation Elections
One key amendment which was offered as part of the proposed
1977-78 labor reform legislation was a proposal to amend the Act's
"free speech" section, section 8(c),'' 8 to explicitly apply it to labor rep-
resentation elections. This statutory section states that union or em-
ployer speech will not constitute an unfair labor practice unless it
114. See generally Shapiro, supra note 71, at 1545.
115. The author is indebted to Professor Clyde W. Summers for this insightful point.
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982). See generally Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Comm'n., 503i F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (policy statement on natural gas curtail-
ment plans held exempt from APA rulemaking requirements).
117. This Act was introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 8310, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977) and in the Senate as S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1978).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
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contains a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."' "l 9 The
Board, under the aegis of its "laboratory conditions" doctrine,' 2 0 has in
the past set aside and postponed elections because of speech involving
neither threats nor promises of benefit. In recent years, however, the
NLRB has begun to question the viability of its "laboratory conditions"
doctrine, particularly as applied to the area of election misrepresenta-
tions of fact. 12 1 In 1977 the Board in an important decision held that, as
a general rule, elections would no longer be set aside or postponed be-
cause of election misrepresentations.' 22 This decision was, however,
then reversed by the Board in 1978 and reinstated in 1982.123
The policy instability which has recently plagued this area would
have been avoided had the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978 become
law. 124 That proposed legislation contained language explicitly apply-
ing section 8(c) to the representation election context, and abolishing
the "laboratory conditions" doctrine. Initially, the amendment was part
of an alternative minority party labor reform bill entitled the "Employee
Bill of Rights Act" introduced in the House of Representatives by Con-
gressmen Erlenborn and Ashbrook.' 25 This proposed amendment was
then incorporated by the Senate into the basic majority party reform
package as enacted by the House. 12 6 In reporting the incorporation of
this minority proposal into the basic labor reform bill, the Senate
Human Resources Committee noted the importance it would serve in
fostering free debate and speech in labor elections.1
2 7
There are forceful arguments that Congress should once again give
careful attention to the issue of free speech in labor representation elec-
tions. The results of the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study aside, it
seems unclear at best whether Congress ever had any idea that the
NLRB would circumvent section 8(c) and establish an independent "lab-
oratory conditions" scheme for regulating labor election speech. In-
stead, it appears considerably more likely that Congress simply assumed
that the Board would continue, as it had done in the past, applying stan-
dards established for unfair labor practices in the election area as well,
119. Id. See supra notes 50, 51 and accompanying text.
120. The NLRB stated in the 1948 General Shoe case that "[i]n election proceedings, it is
the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (this statement announced
what has come to be known as the "laboratory conditions doctrine"). See generally notes
52-65 supra and accompanying text; Bok, supra note 54.
121. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
122. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
123. See supra notes 63, 64 and accompanying text.
124. The legislation was ultimately "defeated", i.e., enough votes could not be gar-
nered to stop the filibuster inJune, 1978. 124 CONG. REC. S9405 (daily ed. June 22, 1978).
This was well before the Labor Board's General Knit decision of December 6, 1978 revers-
ing Shopping Kart. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 777 n.129.
125. See Comment, supra note 13, at 792-93 & nn. 188-191.
126. H.R. 8310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977); see also S. 2467, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
§ 6 (1978); see also Comment, supra note 13, at 795.
127. See S. REP. No. 628, supra note 79, at 26-28.
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and that section 8(c) would govern both. 128 From the point of view of
enforcing original congressional intent, as well as from the central per-
spective of increasing labor policy stability, congressional action clearly
applying section 8(c) to labor representation elections is merited.
3. Codifying Collyer?
Another important amendment offered as part of the Labor Reform
Act of 1978 was a minority party proposal presented by Congressmen
Erlenborn and Ashbrook, and Senators Hatch and Tower, designed to
codify the Board's Collyer and National Radio precedents 129 mandating
NLRB deferral to arbitration.' 3 0 The proposed statutory amendment
provided that:
[I]f an employer, or a labor organization on its own behalf or
on behalf of employees, or employees on their own behalf or
on behalf of other employees could submit a dispute to binding
arbitration under the terms of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement, or have agreed to submit a dispute to binding arbi-
tration, or have submitted a dispute to binding arbitration, then
such arbitration shall be the exclusive forum and such party or
any person on whose behalf such action has or could be taken,
shall only have the right to institute or maintain an unfair labor
practice proceeding before the Board involving the same inci-
dent or subject matter when determinations of such arbitration
are inconsistent with the rights granted by this Act.'
3 '
Arguably, under this amendment, contractual arbitration would
have become the exclusive remedy in disputes involving both breaches
of contract and unfair labor practices. Recourse to the Board's unfair
practice machinery would be permitted only under Spielberg-like condi-
tions' 3 2 where the arbitrator's determinations are found to be "inconsis-
tent" with the Act. Unlike the proposed amendment regarding
application of section 8(c) to representation elections, however, no bi-
partisan consensus was reached on this issue during congressional con-
sideration of the Labor Reform Act in 1977 and 1978. There are never-
theless many strong arguments in support of the
Erlenborn/Ashbrook/Hatch/Tower approach, particularly in terms of
promoting the Labor Act's bias in favor of the use of voluntary dispute
settlement mechanisms. '
3 3
128. See Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections: Effect of Taft-Hartley Act
Section 8(c), 58 YALE L.J. 165, 174 (1948). Board dictum in Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 n. 11 (1962), stated that "Congress specifically limited Section 8(c) to
the adversary proceedings involved in unfair labor practice cases and [that] it has no appli-
cation to representation cases." This seems clearly erroneous. It is far more likely that
Congress simply assumed that the Board would apply section 8(c) in both instances. See
generally NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 658-59 & n.5 (4th Cir.)
(Soper, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
129. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
130. See S. 1855, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 reprinted in Hearings, supra note 85, at 23-24.
131. Id.
132. See generally notes 33 to 39 supra and accompanying text.
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
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The primary weakness with such a broad deferral approach, how-
ever, is its impact on individual employee rights, both with respect to the
potential abrogation of statutory rights which may be involved,"3 4 but
even more so with respect to inherent weaknesses in the American labor
arbitration system. This latter point has recently been very insightfully
developed by Professor Reginald Alleyne, 135 who noted that the exist-
ence of a grievance arbitration mechanism in a labor contract does not
per se mean that a dispute will necessarily be heard by a labor arbitra-
tor. 136 Alleyne emphasized that, absent a breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation,'1 7 unions are free to take, or not take, a case to arbitration,
and that a number of political and economic factors may influence this
decision.' 38 The bottom line in all of this being that there is little cer-
tainty that the rights of the individual employee will be vindicated in the
arbitration process.'
39
As a possible reform in this area, Professor Alleyne suggested that
parties charging unfair labor practices be given the option of pursuing a
given case in either the arbitral or NLRB forums. 14 0 This approach
would afford charging parties the opportunity to pursue a particular
case in the manner they perceive as most advantageous while avoiding
the "two bites at the apple" problem, the anathema of many manage-
ment representatives.' 4 ' Such an approach, if statutorily mandated,
would also provide a sharp measure of procedural stability for an area of
labor law beset by ongoing change and controversy.142 In considering
future labor law reforms, the "Alleyne charging party option" approach
to arbitral deferral, is one that Congress should study closely.
III. CONCLUSION
The perennial problem of National Labor Relations Board policy
instability has, in recent months, taken on rather unusual proportions,
engendering cries for congressional reform. This article has examined
the problem of NLRB policy vacillation, and has offered several reme-
dies in the context of possible congressional action. Particular attention
has been given to various proposals presented as part of the Labor Law
Reform Act of 1978, which was enacted by the U.S. House of Represent-
atives, but successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate.
134. See generally Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II, A Fresh
Approach to Board Deferral Arbitration, 4 IND. REL. L.J. 680 (1981).
135. See Alleyne, Arbitrators and the NLRB: The Nature of the Deferral Beast, 4 IND. REL. L.J.
587 (1981).
136. Id. at 600-02.
137. See generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under The Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977).
138. See Alleyne, supra note 135, at 602 & n.54.
139. Id. at 601-03.
140. Id.
14 1. See, e.g., Statement of Former NLRB General Counsel John Irving Before House
Oversight Hearings on NLRB, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),June 27, 1984 at E-8. See generally
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (upholding an employee's right to
"two bites at the apple" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
142. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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It has been asserted that, as a general proposition, there is consider-
able merit to the idea that Congress resist pressures for reform in this
area, and maintain the status quo. From this perspective, NLRB shifts in
policy can be seen as merely reflecting the rather regular shifts in Board
membership which occur because of the relatively short terms office
members are afforded under the Act. It can be argued that such changes
in membership, and consequently in policy, help keep the Board and
our labor laws responsive to prevailing political climates. Moreover, it is
clear that the overwhelming majority of Board decisions do involve clear
adherence to time honored precedents.
Nevertheless, there are also strong arguments in favor of congres-
sional action dealing with the problem of Board decisional instability.
Various proposals presented as part of the aborted Labor Reform Act of
1978 present considerable promise. In particular, congressional action
requiring that the Board make greater use of rulemaking, and applying
section 8(c) to representation elections would be especially constructive.
Careful congressional study of other ways of better coping with the
problem of abrupt NLRB policy shifts, such as mandating Board polit-
ical balance, and providing for a charging party arbitration deferral op-
tion, also seem called for. The considerable uncertainty caused by
recent bouts of NLRB policy "flip-flops" seems to argue, if nothing else,
for more careful congressional examination of the issue.
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